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THE REQUIREMENT OF CORROBORATION IN




A favorite subject of legal commentary at the present time is the nature
of the rights guaranteed to defendants in criminal cases by the United
States Constitution. Those less glamorous safeguards which find their
basis not in the Bill of Rights but in statutes or decisions have received
less than their due. This article is an attempt to remedy the deficiency
with respect to one of them: the requirement of corroborative evidence
in prosecutions for sex offenses. To that end, the article summarizes the
rule of number by which several pieces of evidence must be associated in
presentation before the jury may consider any one of them; I surveys the
manner in which other jurisdictions have applied the rule requiring cor-
roboration in prosecutions for sex offenses; describes the development
and present state of the rule in New York; and offers criticism and sug-
gestions for change.
II. CORROBORATION AcCORDING TO THE RULE OF NUmBER
The Code of the Emperor Justinian stated that on any important issue
the testimony of a single witness would be inadequate.2 This general prin-
ciple, called the rule of number, was taken up in ecclesiastical law which
gave it practical effect by specifying, in many instances, the precise num-
ber of witnesses necessary to prove a point. Against the word of a
Cardinal, for example, forty-four witnesses were required.3 The rule
of number made perfect sense to the canon lawyers of the middle
ages, for whom the act of taking the oath itself had probative force. The
more times the oath was taken, the greater was the persuasiveness which
* Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York. Judge Younger received his A.B.
from Harvard College and his LL.B. from New York University where he was the Editor-
in-Chief of the Law Review.
1. The definition is Wigmore's. 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2030 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter
cited as Wigmore].
2. 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 203-11 (3d ed. 1944); Wigmore, Required
Number of Witnesses; A Brief History of the Numerical System in England, IS Harv. L.
Rev. 83 (1901). In writing this and the following sentences, I have borrowed liberally from
the scholarship of Holdsworth and Wigmore, to whose masterful work I am, like every other
lawyer, much in debt.
3. Wigmore § 2032.
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attached to the testimony that followed. Certainty rested not in careful
scrutiny of the significance of each oath with respect to the person taking
it, but in a simple count of the number of swearers. Gradually, as other
modes of inquiry into the truth became fashionable, the rather primitive
formalism of the rule of number gave way to conceptions of evidence
and of proof more congenial to the modern mind. To illustrate, until the
early eighteenth century, an English jury was free to consider its own
extra-judicial knowledge of a cause.' This being so, it was difficult to ask
the jury to give its verdict automatically to the side with the longer line
of witnesses in court. The consequence, ultimately, was that the common
law rejected the rule of number; it excepted only prosecutions for perjury
where the testimony of a single witness, without corroboration, remained
insufficient.5
III. CORROBORATION IN JURISDICTIONS OTHER THAN NEW YORKC
Many American jurisdictions follow the common law rule, imposing
no requirement of corroboration in sex offense cases.' It is fairly well
known, however, that charges of sexual misconduct are easy to make
and difficult to rebut.7 Accordingly, several states have chosen to depart
from the common law rule.
4. See 9 W. Holdsworth, supra note 2, at 137; J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evi-
dence 296 (1898).
5. One court has said, without citation of authority and erroneously, that the common
law also required corroboration in prosecutions for rape. People v. Friedman, 139 App. Div.
795, 796, 124 N.Y.S. 521, 522 (2d Dep't 1910). But see People v. Gibson, 301 N.Y. 244, 93 N.E.
2d 827 (1950) where the court properly noted: "At common law, in the case of sexual of-
fenses, it was not necessary that the testimony of the injured female be corroborated ....
The necessity of corroboration, if it exists at all, must thus be found in a specific statute."
Id. at 245, 93 N.E.2d at 827 (citation omitted).
6. E.g., Herndon v. State, 2 Ala. App. 118, 56 So. 85 (1911); People v. Gump, 17 Cal.
App. 2d 221, 61 P.2d 970 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936). But cf. People v. Gidney, 10 Cal. 2d 138,
73 P.2d 1186 (1937); McQueary v. People, 48 Colo. 214, 110 P.2d 210 (1910). Additional
cases are collected in Wigmore § 2061.
7. A classic expression of this perception is that of Lord Chief Justice Hale: "The party
ravished may give evidence upon oath and is in law a competent witness; but the credi-
bility of her testimony, and how far forth she is to be believed, must be left to the jury,
and is more or less credible according to the circumstances of fact that concur in that
testimony.... It is one thing whether a witness be admissible to be heard; another thing,
whether they are to be believed when heard. It is true, rape is a most detestable crime, and
therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remem-
bered that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved; and harder to be
defended by the party accused, the never so innocent." 1680 Pleas of the Crown I, 633,
635, cited in Wigmore § 2060, at 342-45; see text accompanying note 104 infra.
CORROBORATION IN SEX OFFENSES
A. Rape
A number of states, either by statute" or decision,' have decreed that
corroboration is necessary to sustain a conviction of rape. Beyond that
there is no uniformity of view. Among the circumstances which have been
held to constitute sufficient corroboration are the opportunity to commit
the crime,"° presence at the scene of the crime," the subsequent birth
of a child,' physical signs of recent violent intercourse,13 the defendant's
expressions of desire for the complainant,14 the fact that the complainant
complained,' 5 and the defendant's admissions concerning the act.10 In
addition, a few states do not require corroboration as such, but recognize
certain situations in which the bare word of the complainant will simply
not do. Thus, some courts have insisted upon the introduction of cor-
roborative evidence where the complainant's testimony is not clear and
convincing,17 is incredible,' improbable,"0 or contradictory," where the
defendant denies the accusation, 1 where the complainant did not make
prompt outcry,22 or where her testimony is inconsistent with the sur-
rounding circumstances.2
8. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1304 (1953); Iowa Code Ann. § 782.4 (1950); Miss. Code
Ann. § 2360 (1956); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-374 (1969).
9. E.g., Davis v. State, 120 Ga. 433, 48 S.E. 180 (1904); State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50, 187
P.2d 976 (1947); Stapleman v. State, 150 Neb. 460, 34 N.W.2d 907 (1948); State v. Cleven-
ger, 27 N.M. 466, 202 P. 687 (1921).
10. State v. Fehr, 45 S.D. 634, 189 N.W. 942 (1922).
11. Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
12. State v. Mason, 41 Idaho 506, 239 P. 733 (1925).
13. People v. Cox, 383 I. 617, 50 N.E.2d 758 (1943).
14. Whetstone v. State, 99 Neb. 469, 156 N.W. 1049 (1916).
15. People v. DeFrates, 395 flL 439, 70 N.E.2d 591, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 811 (1947).
16. Autrey v. State, 94 Fla. 229, 114 So. 244 (1927) ; State v. Geier, 184 Iowa 874, 167
N.W. 186 (1918).
17. People v. Nelson, 360 Ill. 562, 196 N.E. 726 (1935).
18. State v. Haston, 64 Ariz. 72, 166 P.2d 141 (1946) ; State v. Beacraft, 126 W. Va. 895,
30 S.E.2d 541 (1944).
19. McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 132, 213 S.W.2d 1007 (1948).
20. Roberts v. State, 87 Okla. Crim. 93, 194 P.2d 219 (1948).
21. People v. Garafola, 369 L 232, 16 N.E.2d 741 (1938); Boling v. State, 91 Neb. 599,
136 N.W. 1078 (1912).
22. Hindman v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 75, 211 S.W.2d 182 (1948); Armstrong v. State,
136 Tex. Crim. 33, 125 S.W.2d 578 (1939).
23. See Boyd v. State, 189 Miss. 609, 198 So. 561 (1940).
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B. Seduction by Promise of Marriage and Other Sex Crimes
Many states, by statute, require corroboration in prosecutions for the
crime of seduction by promise of marriage.24 The type of evidence which
will suffice varies. Some states demand corroboration of all material ele-
ments of the crime; 25 others merely require that the complainant be
shown in some measure worthy of belief. 20 Still other states demand cor-
roboration for both the promise of marriage and the act of intercourse, 7
while others require corroborating evidence only for the promise of mar-
riage. 8 Yet others add a final requirement that the prior virtue of the
complainant be supported by something more than her uncorroborated
declaration.29
Various states require corroboration in prosecutions for adultery,
0
abortion,3' compulsory prostitution, 2 fornication, 3 and abduction.34 The
standards used to determine whether the corroboration is sufficient, how-
ever, are too miscellaneous to make discussion profitable.
24. Ala. Code tit. 14, § 419 (1958); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3408 (1947) ; Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 40-9-7 (1963); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1612 (1956); Iowa Code Ann. § 782.4 (1946);
Miss. Code Ann. § 2374 (1956); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 546.340 (1949); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 94-7216 (1947); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:142-3 (1969); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-180 (1969);
N.D. Cent. Code § 12-32-03 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.63 (Page 1954); Okla.
Stat. Ann. it. 22, § 744 (1969); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 167.025(2) (1969); Pa. Stat. Ann. it.
18, § 4510 (1959); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-37-4 (1969); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-405 (1962);
S.D. Code § 34.3639 (Supp. 1960); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.07 (1966); Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.1-42 (1960) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-261 (1957).
25. E.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1612 (1956).
26. E.g., Pace v. State, 32 Ala. App. 65, 21 So. 2d 565 (1945).
27. E.g., Rickey v. State, 74 Okla. Crim. 398, 126 P.2d 753 (1942).
28. E.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4510 (1959).
29. E.g., State v. Forbes, 210 N.C. 567, 187 S.E. 760 (1936); State v. Crook, 189 N.C.
545, 127 S.E. 579 (1925).
30. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 312 (1953).
31. Cal. Penal Code § 1108 (West 1970); Idaho Code § 19-2115 (1947); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 94-7216 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.301 (1969); Pa. Stat. Ann. it. 19,
§ 583 (1964); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-83 (1962); Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-14 (1953).
32. Ala. Code tit. 14, § 3 (1958); Cal. Penal Code § 1108 (West 1970); Idaho Code
§ 19-2115 (1968); Iowa Code Ann. § 782.4 (1946); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 11 (1968);
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-7216 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.301 (1969); N.D. Cent.
Code § 12-22-24 (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. it. 22, § 744 (1969); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 167.140
(1969); Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-14 (1953).
33. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 579:4 (1955).
34. Idaho Code § 19-2115 (1968); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2013 (1964); Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.1-42 (1960); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-261 (1957).
CORROBORATION IN SEX OFFENSES
IV. CORROBORATION IN NEW YoRK STATE
For nearly a century, New York's statutes have required corroborative
evidence in prosecutions for certain sex offenses." However, in one respect
at least, New York law relating to this requirement is different from that
of other jurisdictions; it has surpassed them all in the number and com-
plexity of its rules on corroboration.
A. Offenses Where Corroboration is Specifically Required by Statute
1. The Law Prior to 1967
Under the Penal Law which prevailed in New York prior to 1967, cor-
roboration was required in prosecutions for abduction, 3 adultery," com-
pulsory prostitution of a wife,38 rape,39 seduction, 0 and compulsory
prostitution.41 In construing these statutes the courts were concerned with
three questions: (1) How much corroborative evidence would suffice?
(2) Could the jury return a conviction of a lesser sex offense (as to which
there was no corroboration requirement), the commission of which was
revealed in the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant describing
a greater sex offense (as to which there was a corroboration require-
ment)? (3) Could the jury return a conviction of a non-sex offense (as
35. Law of July 26, 1881, ch. 676, § 283, [1881] N.Y. Laws 104th Sess. 69. This statute
was amended in 1886 (Law of June 15, 1886, ch. 663, § 1, (18861 N.Y. Laws 109th Sess.
953) and in 1909 became part of the Penal Law which remained authoritative in New York
until 1967. Law of May 27, 1909, ch. 524, § 1, (1909] N.Y. Laws 132d Seas. 1316 (codified,
until repealed, at N.Y. Penal Law § 2177 (McKinney 1944)).
36. N.Y. Penal Law § 71 (McKinney 1944) (repealed 1967) provided: "No conviction
can be had for abduction, upon the testimony of the female abducted, unsupported by other
evidence."
37. Id. § 103 provided: "A conviction under this article (adultery] can not be had on
the uncorroborated testimony of the person with whom the offense is charged to have been
committed."
38. Id. § 1091 provided: "In all prosecutions under the previous section (compulsory
prostitution of wife], the wife shall be a competent witness against the husband, but no
conviction under this article shall be had upon the testimony of the wife unsupported by
other evidence."
39. Id. § 2013 (now N.Y. Penal Law § 130.15 (McKinney 1967)) provided: "No con-
viction can be had for rape or defilement upon the testimony of the female defiled, unsup-
ported by other evidence."
40. Id. § 2177 (repealed 1967) provided: "No conviction can be had for an offense spa-
cifled in the last section [seduction under promise or pretense of marriage], upon the testi-
mony of the female seduced, unsupported by other evidence." (footnote omitted).
41. Id. § 2460(9) (now N.Y. Penal Law § 230,35 (McKinney 1967)) provided: "No
conviction shall be had under this section [compulsory prostitution of women] upon the
testimony of the female unless supported by other evidence."
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to which there was no corroboration requirement), the commission of
which was disclosed in the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant
as part of an episode in the course of which a sex offense (as to which
there was a corroboration requirement) was also committed?
a. How Much Corroborative Evidence is Sufficient?
Analytically, the prosecution of any crime involves proof of three prop-
ositions. First, it must be proved that something has occured, e.g., the
complainant has been sexually penetrated. Second, it must be proved
that the cause of the occurence is criminal in nature, e.g., the penetration
was without the complainant's consent. Finally, it must be proved that
the defendant committed the act.42 The first two propositions constitute
the corpus delicti. Where they are conceded or are obvious, the trial deals
solely with the third proposition. Where the first two are in contention,
the trial deals with all three.
The New York courts have read the corroboration statutes as requiring
corroboration, not merely of the first two propositions, but of all three,
i.e., that a crime has been committed and that the defendant is the guilty
party. The customary formula is that the corroboration "must extend to
all the material elements of the crime and connect the defendant with its
commission."' 3 Searching for a more detailed measure, one finds that the
corroboration need not be enough in and of itself to support a convic-
tion,44 nor must it consist in eyewitness testimony or confirmation of the
complainant's story in every detail.!5 On the other hand, some types of
evidence are too flimsy to do service as corroboration. Thus, it has been
held insufficient to constitute corroborative evidence that the complainant
complained promptly,46 that the defendant had been convicted of rape
before, 47 that the defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime,48
42. Wigmore § 2072.
43. Communication and Study Relating to Requirement of Corroborative Evidence for
Conviction of Certain Crimes, 1962 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Ann. Rep. 639, 653; see
People v. Masse, 5 N.Y.2d 217, 156 N.E2d 452, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1959) (rape); People
v. Jelke, 1 N.Y.2d 321, 135 NYE.2d 213, 152 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1956) (compulsory prostitution);
People v. Downs, 236 N.Y. 306, 140 N.E. 706 (1923) (rape); People v. Plath, 100 N.Y.
590, 3 N.E. 790 (1885) (abduction).
44. People v. Imperiale, 14 Misc. 2d 887, 180 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Spec. Sess. 1957).
45. People v. Adams, 72 App. Div. 166, 76 N.Y.S. 361 (ist Dep't 1902).
46. People v. Carey, 223 N.Y. 519, 119 N.E. 83 (1918) (per curiam); People v. Murray,
183 App. Div. 468, 170 N.Y.S. 873 (2d Dep't 1918); People v. Green, 103 App. Div. 79,
92 N.Y.S. 508 (3d Dep't 1905). But cf. People v. Yannucci, 283 N.Y. 546, 550, 29 NXE.2d
185, 186 (1940).
47. People v. Bills, 129 App. Div. 798, 114 N.Y.S. 587 (4th Dep't 1909).
48. People v. Croes, 285 N.Y. 279, 34 N.E.2d 320 (1941); People v. Tench, 167 N.Y.
[Vol. 40
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or that the defendant made something less than clear-cut admissions.40
Any attempt to generalize further is "a waste of... time.") °
b. Conviction of a Lesser Sex Offense Where the Testimony
Describes a Greater Sex Offense
Assume that the defendant has been indicted for rape.51 The complain-
ant testifies that it happended, but there is no corroboration; therefore
there can be no conviction for rape.2 Suppose, however, that the jury
convicts the defendant for a lesser offense included within the charge of
rape, such as attempted rape3 or assault with intent to commit rape."
For these lesser offenses, no corroboration is required. The question then
arises: May the conviction stand? "Yes," answered a number of courts."
520, 60 N.E. 737 (1901); People v. Kingsley, 166 App. Div. 320, 151 N.Y -S. 980 (3d Dep't
1915); People v. Cole, 134 App. Div. 759, 119 N.Y.S. 259 (3d Dep't 1909). It appears,
however, that evidence of opportunity may be enough to corroborate the third element,
i.e., defendant's identity as the assailant. People v. Masse, 5 N.Y.2d 217, 156 N.E.2d 452,
182 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1959); People v. Deitsch, 237 N.Y. 300, 142 N.E. 670 (1923) (dictum).
49. People v. Downs, 236 N.Y. 306, 140 N.E. 706 (1923); People v. Page, 162 N.Y. 272,
56 N.E. 750 (1900).
50. This superb example of the Dismissal Magisterial is Wigmore's. Wigmore § 2062, at
356. Representative cases holding particular items of evidence to be sufficient are: People
v. Yannucd, 283 N.Y. 546, 29 N.E.2d 185 (1940); People v. Deitsch, 237 N.Y. 300,
142 N.E. 670 (1923); People v. Chumley, 24 App. Div. 2d 805, 263 N.Y.S.2d 748 (3d Dept
1965); People v. Marshall, 5 App. Div. 2d 352, 172 N.YS.2d 237 (3d Dep't 1958), afi'd
mem., 6 N.Y.2d 823, 159 N.E.2d 698, 188 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1959). Cases holding particular
items of evidence insufficient are: People v. Czyz, 262 App. Div. 1027, 30 N.Y.S.2d 299
(2d Dep't 1941); People v. Speeks, 173 App. Div. 440, 159 N.Y.S. 308 (2d Dep't 1916);
People v. Shaw, 158 App. Div. 146, 142 N.Y.S. 782 (3d Dep't 1913); People v. Doyle, 1S8
App. Div. 37, 142 N.Y.S. 884 (3d Dep't 1913); People v. Haischer, 81 App. Div. 559, 81
N.Y.S. 79 (4th Dep't 1903).
51. N.Y. Penal Law § 2010 (McKinney 1944) (now N.Y. Penal Law §§ 130.25-.35 (Mc-
Kinney 1967)).
52. Id. § 2013; see note 39 supra.
53. This was not mentioned in the appropriate article of the pre-1967 Penal Law (N.Y.
Penal Law art. 180 (McKinney 1944) (now N.Y. Penal Law art. 130 (McKinney 1967)),
and therefore was cognizable under the general attempt provisions. Id. art. 22 (now N.Y.
Penal Law art. 110 (McKinney 1967)).
54. Id. art. 20 (now N.Y. Penal Law §§ 35.10-30, 120.00, .05, .10(1) & (4), AS (Mc-
Kinney 1967)).
55. E.g., People v. Weinberger, 2 N.Y.2d 892, 141 N.E.2d 630, 161 N.Y.S.2d 146, cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 913 (1957) (sodomy); People v. Gibson, 301 N.Y. 244, 93 N.E.2d 827
(1950) (incest); People v. Chimino, 270 App. Div. 114, 58 N.Y.S.2d 844 (4th Dept 1945),
aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 554, 68 N.E.2d 863 (1946) (assault with intent to commit rape); Peo-
ple v. Phillips, 204 App. Div. 112, 197 N.Y.S. 567 (2d Dep't 1922), afrd mem. on other
grounds, 235 N.Y. 579, 139 N.E. 742 (1923) (attempted rape); see Note, Corroboration in
the New York Criminal Law, 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 324 (1958).
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Ever alert to their opportunities, prosecutors thereupon fell into the habit
of circumventing the corroboration requirement by procuring convictions
for lesser offenses, as to which corroboration was unnecessary, in cases
where they had only uncorroborated complaints of greater offenses.50
The New York Court of Appeals finally called a halt to this practice in
People v. Lo Verde. There the indictment charged both rape, the con-
viction of which required corroboration, and impairing the morals of a
minor, the conviction of which did not require corroboration. The com-
plainant, without corroboration, testified to a rape. The defendant was
acquitted of rape and convicted of impairing the morals of a minor. Re-
versing the verdict, the court of appeals held that in a case of this kind
corroboration would be required to support a conviction of impairing the
morals of a minor, although no statute specifically required it:
Were we to hold that no corroboration was necessary to support the conviction of the
crime as charged in this indictment, then a prosecutor might easily circumvent the
requirement of corroboration necessary for a conviction of misdemeanor rape simply
by charging instead the impairment of the morals of a minor, as he did here. The law
may not be so circumvented s8
Any misapprehensions"' as to the reach of the holding in Lo Verde were
subsequently corrected by People v. English00 and People v. Radunovic,'"
cases in which the court of appeals made it clear that where the uncor-
roborated testimony of the complainant described a sex offense as to
which corroboration was necessary for conviction, the defendant could
not be found guilty of some lesser sex offense as to which corrobo--a io"
was unnecessary. 2 However, according to the court in People v. Colo-,'
should the jury find the defendant to have actually committed the lesse
sex offense as to which no corroboration is required, it may convict him
of that offense without regard to the lack of corroboration.
56. See M. Ploscowe, Sex and the Law 222 (1951).
57. 7 N.Y.2d 114, 164 N.E.2d 102, 195 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1959).
58. Id. at 116, 164 N.E.2d at 103, 195 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
59. E.g., People v. Dixon, 36 Misc. 2d 1068, 234 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
60. 16 N.Y.2d 719, 209 N.E.2d 722, 262 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965). In this case the court re-
versed convictions of attempted rape and assault with intent to commit rape based upon
the complainant's uncorroborated testimony of actual rape.
61. 21 N.Y.2d 186, 234 N.E.2d 212, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967). In this case the court re-
versed a conviction of assault in the third degree based upon the complainant's uncorrobo-
rated testimony of actual rape.
62. This "anti-circumvention" doctrine applies whether or not the leIser sex offense Is
separately charged in the indictment. People v. Young, 22 N.Y.2d 785, 239 N.E.2d 560, 292
N.Y.S.2d 696 (1968) (mem.).
63. 16 N.Y.2d 988, 212 N.E.2d 891, 265 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1965).
[Vol. 40
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c. Conviction of a Non-Sex Offense Where the Testimony also
Describes a Sex Offense
If the complainant's uncorroborated testimony shows that the defen-
dant committed a rape and a robbery upon her, the defendant cannot be
convicted of the rape since corroboration is lacking. But may he be con-
victed of the robbery, as to which there is no statutory requirement of
corroboration? The answer is that he may, so long as the evidence of rape
is merely "relevant," not "inherent" or "integral," to proof of the rob-
bery. 4 But if a non-sex offense conviction, e.g., burglary, depends upon
proof of an offense, e.g., assault, the sole evidence of which is the com-
plainant's uncorroborated testimony concerning a corroboration-required
sex offense such as rape, the evidence of rape may be deemed inherent or
integral to proof of the burglary. Corroboration will then be required
to sustain the burglary conviction. 5
2. The Law Subsequent to 1967
Effective September 1, 1967, New York State adopted a new Penal
Law. Section 130.15 of the law states: "A person shall not be convicted
of any offense defined in this article, or of an attempt to commit the same,
solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. This section
shall not apply to the offense of sexual abuse in the third degree."' The
offenses defined by article 130 are sexual misconduct,", rape in the
third,6" second, 9 and first7° degrees, consensual sodomy,"' sodomy in the
third,72 second,73 and first74 degrees, and sexual abuse in the third,"
second,76 and first 77 degrees.
64. People v. Moore, 23 N.Y.2d 565, 245 N.E.2d 710, 297 N.Y.S.2d 944, cert. denied,
393 U.S. 887 (1969); People v. Lennon, 22 N.Y.2d 677, 238 N.E.2d 756, 291 N.YS.2d 369
(1968) (per curiam); People v. Jenkins, 22 N.Y.2d 675, 238 N.E.2d 755, 291 N.YS.2d 363
(1968) (per curiam); People v. English, 16 N.Y.2d 719, 209 N.E.2d 722, 262 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1965) (mem.).
65. People v. Scruggs, 31 App. Div. 2d 842, 298 N.YS.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1969) (mer.);
see People v. Sigismondi, 21 N.Y.2d 186, 234 N.E.2d 212, 287 N.YS.2d 33 (1967).
66. N.Y. Penal Law § 130.15 (McKinney 1967).
67. Id. § 130.20.
68. Id. § 130.25.
69. Id. § 130.30.
70. Id. § 130.35.
71. Id. § 130.38.
72. Id. § 130.40.
73. Id. § 130.45.
74. Id. § 130.50.
75. Id. § 130.55.
76. Id. § 130.60.
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Where the Penal Law in effect prior to 1967 required corroboration for
six sex offenses as there defined,78 the current Penal Law requires cor-
roboration for ten sex offenses as newly defined. Further, the current law
makes explicit the requirement of corroboration for attempts to commit
corroboration-necessary sex offenses; it thereby minimizes the confusion
attendant upon courts threading their way through the "anti-circumven-
tion" cases79 and forestalls the problem of prosecutors' misuse of the
doctrine announced in Colon.80
By excluding from the requirement of corroboration the offense of
sexual abuse in the third degree, however, the draftsmen of the current
Penal Law kept open the issue whether a defendant charged with a
sex offense as to which corroboration is necessary can, in the absence of
corroboration, be convicted of a sex offense, such as sexual abuse in the
third degree, as to which corroboration is unnecessary. This issue was
recently resolved in People v. Doyle,81 where the dispute concerned a
charge of sexual abuse in the third degree supported solely by the com-
plainant's uncorroborated testimony of rape and sodomy, as to which the
law requires corroboration. Nevertheless, argued the prosecutor, the sexu-
al abuse charge should not be dismissed since the statute excludes that
offense from the requirement of corroboration. The court disagreed,
saying that Lo Verde, English, and Radunovic show that the district at-
torney may not circumvent the statutory requirement of corroboration by
charging a lesser or different offense as to which corroboration is unneces-
sary, which he then proves by the complainant's uncorroborated testi-
mony of an offense as to which corroboration is necessary.82 Therefore
testimony of sexual abuse in the third degree must be corroborated when
the complainant in fact describes the commission of a sex offense requir-
ing corroboration. The statute's exemption applies only when the act
actually charged and found by the jury to have been committed is sexual
abuse in the third degree.'
77. Id. § 130.65.
78. See notes 36-41 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 51-62 supra. See also People v. Colon, 37 App. Div. 2d
21, 321 N.Y.S.2d 992 (2d Dep't 1971).
80. The misuse would occur if a prosecutor put uncorroborated testimony of a com-
pleted corroboration-necessary offense before the jury and then asked for an attempt con-
viction. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
81. 31 App. Div. 2d 490, 300 N.Y.S.2d 719 (2d Dep't 1969), aff'd mem., 26 N.Y.2d 752,
257 N.E.2d 648, 309 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1970).
82. Id. at 498, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
83. Id. at 499, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 728; see People v. Colon, 16 N.Y.2d 988, 212 N.E.2d
891, 265 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1965). The decision in Doyle is criticized in 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
[Vol. 40
1971] CORROBORATION IN SEX OFFENSES
B. Cases Involving the Testimony of Children
In many states, corroboration of an infant complainant is not required
to sustain a sex offense conviction. 4 Several courts hold that some mea-
sure of corroboration is necessary when the infant's testimony is inher-
ently improbable85 or inconsistent, 0 or where there is a motive to falsify. 7
Other courts have adopted the practice of instructing the jury to examine
the testimony of an infant with great care and caution.88
In New York, no person may be convicted on the unsworn testimony
of a child under twelve years of age89 unless that testimony is corroborated
by evidence as to each essential element of the crime.e A judge may,
however, determine that a child under twelve is competent, in which
instance the child takes the oath and the jury considers his testimony as
it would the testimony of any other witness.91
Apart from these general rules, New York courts have traditionally
1025 (1969). The present Penal Law makes no other change in the matters discussed above.
In People v. Thompson, 36 App. Div. 2d 497, 321 N.Y.S.2d 941 (3d Dep't 1971), however,
the court held that, in connection with a prosecution for sexual abuse in the first degree
(N.Y. Penal Law § 130.65 (McKinney 1967)) and sodomy in the third degree (id. § 130A0)
committed upon a fifteen-year old boy, the old rule requiring corroboration of "all the
material elements of the crime" (text accompanying note 43 supra) would be replaced by a
rule simply requiring "corroboration of a sort which lends credibility to the victim's testimony
.... " 36 App. Div. 2d at 499, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
84. People v. Carlson, 73 Cal. App. 2d 933, 167 P.2d 812 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946); Wesner
v. People, 126 Colo. 400, 250 P.2d 124 (1952); Jones v. People, 69 Colo. 500, 195 P. 526
(1921); State v. Doss, 246 Iowa 651, 67 N.W.2d 451 (1954); State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415,
34 So. 2d 909 (1948); State v. Newcomb, 146 Me. 173, 78 A.2d 787 (1951); Pittman v.
State, 236 Miss. 592, 111 So. 2d 415 (1959); State v. King, 342 Mo. 975, 119 S.W.2d 277
(1938); State v. Browne, 7 N.J. Misc. 1, 143 A. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (per curiam); State
v. Ellison, 19 N.M. 428, 144 P. 10 (1914); Davis v. State, 272 P.2d 478 (Okla. Crim. App.
1954); Curtis v. State, 167 Tenn. 427, 70 S.W.2d 363 (1932); State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah
27, 61 P. 215 (1900); State v. Pickett, 259 Wis. 593, 49 N.W.2d 712 (1951); see Wigmore
§ 2066.
85. See People v. Manuel, 94 Cal. App. 2d 20, 209 P.2d 981 (Dist. CL App. 1949) (dic-
tum); People v. Goard, 11 111. 2d 495, 144 N.E.2d 603 (1957) (dictum).
86. See State v. Perlin, 268 Wis. 529, 68 N.W.2d 32 (1955) (dictum).
87. Id.
88. People v. Garrett, 27 Cal. App. 2d 249, 81 P.2d 241 (DisL CL App. 1938); State
v. Dodson, 67 N.M. 146, 353 P.2d 364 (1960).
89. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.20 (McKinney 1971).
90. See, e.g., People v. Dutton, 305 N.Y. 632, 111 N.E.2d 889 (1953) (per curiam);
People v. Nolan, 2 App. Div. 2d 144, 153 N.Y.S.2d 905 (4th Dep't 1956) (per curiam) ; People
v. Spencer, 165 N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1971, at 19, col 7 (Queens County Crim. CL); People v.
Fazio, 5 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Rochester City Ct. 1938).
91. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.20 (McKinney 1971); see People v. Klein, 266 N.Y. 188,
194 N.E. 402 (1935) (per curiam).
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taken a strict view of infant testimony in sex offense prosecutions. Virtu-
ally every conviction based upon the uncorroborated testimony of an
infant has been reversed, not for lack of corroboration, since the statute
in these cases required none, but for insufficiency of proofY2
This proclivity to reverse is best examined in People v. Oyola" and
People v. PorcaroY4 In Oyola, the court of appeals reversed convictions
of impairing the morals of a minor and third degree assault"z based upon
the uncorroborated sworn testimony of a ten-year-old complainant. The
majority opinion suggested that some supporting evidence was necessary
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." In Porcaro, the court reversed
a conviction for impairing the morals of a minor, also based upon the un-
corroborated sworn testimony of a ten-year-old complainant. The major-
ity opinion stated that the conviction had to be reversed "[f]or the
reasons stated in People v. Oyola . . . ."' Judge Fuld, concurring, noted
that "as [a] matter of law, no conviction for impairing the morals of a
child may validly rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the child
victim.""o
In sum then, sex offense convictions resting upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an infant complainant will almost always be reversed for
insufficiency of evidence. Furthermore, it remains a possibility that the
court of appeals will formulate a rule, inspired by Judge Fuld's concur-
rence in Porcaro, insisting upon corroboration of an infant complainant's
testimony in sex offense cases even when the statute under which the
prosecution has been lodged does not require it.0
92. People v. Meyers, 309 N.Y. 837, 130 N.E.2d 622 (1955) (mem.); People v. Rosen,
293 N.Y. 683, 56 N.E.2d 297 (1944) (mem.); People v. Derner, 288 N.Y. 599, 42 N.E.2d
605 (1942) (mem.); People v. Slaughter, 278 N.Y. 479, 15 N.E.2d 70 (1938) (inem.);
People v. Churgin, 261 N.Y. 661, 185 N.E. 782 (1933) (mem.); People v. Levy, 265 App.
Div. 841, 37 N.Y.S.2d 648 (2d Dep't 1942) (mem.); People v. Clemons, 242 App, Div. 846,
275 N.Y.S. 982 (2d Dep't 1934) (mem.); People v. Saraceno, 150 App. Div. 786, 135 N.Y.S.
149 (2d Dep't 1912); People v. Donohue, 114 App. Div. 830, 100 N.Y.S. 202 (2d Dep't
1906).
93. 6 N.Y.2d 259, 160 N.E.2d 494, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1959).
94. 6 N.Y.2d 248, 160 N.E.2d 488, 189 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1959).
95. For neither of these crimes did the statute require corroboration.
96. 6 N.Y.2d at 263-64, 160 N.E.2d at 497-98, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
97. 6 N.Y.2d at 252, 160 N.E.2d at 490, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
98. Id., 160 N.E.2d at 490, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The dissent points out that neither the
Penal Law nor the Code of Criminal Procedure required corroboration to sustain a con-
viction of impairing the morals of a minor. Id. at 253, 160 N.E.2d at 491, 189 N.Y.S.2d at
198. See People v. Thompson, 36 App. Div. 2d 497, 321 N.Y.S.2d 941 (3d Dep't 1971), in
which the court rested its decision on the authority of Judge Fuld's concurrence. See also
note 83 supra.
99. Compare the language of certain lower court opinions stating that an infant corn-
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C. Cases Involving the Testimony of Accomplices
New York State demands that the testimony of an accomplice be cor-
roborated by other evidence "tending to connect the defendant with the
commission of [the] offense."' With respect to those sex offenses in-
dependently requiring corroboration, 101 the accomplice rule is unimpor-
tant since corroboration will be required every time. However, with
respect to those sex offenses which have no independent requirement of
corroboration, a distinction must be made between complainants who are
victims and complainants who participated in the act in question as prin-
cipals. Those who are victims cannot be accomplices; thus their testi-
mony need not be corroborated.0 2 Those who are properly designated as
principals in the commission of the act are accomplices; thus their
testimony must be corroborated. 03
V. SUGGEsTIONS FOR IM:PROVEMENT
It has been said that those accused of sex offenses need extraordinary
protection since the charge is often false, the defense may lack supporting
plainant's testimony must always be corroborated. People v. Smith, 6 Misc. 2d 732, 734,
167 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1957); People v. Ohlson, 37 N.Y..2d 421, 422 (Kings
County Ct. 1942). But see People v. Weinberger, 2 App. Div. 2d 806, 153 N.Y.S.2d 926
(4th Dep't 1956) (mem.), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 892, 141 N.E.2d 630, 161 N.Y-S.2d 146,
cert. denied, 354 US. 913 (1957), where the court of appeals affirmed, without discussion,
a conviction of carnal abuse based upon the uncorroborated testimony of two infants, one
thirteen and the other fifteen. Since in People v. Slaughter, 278 N.Y. 479, 15 N.E.2d 70
(1938) (mem.), the court had reversed a conviction of impairing the morals of a minor
based upon the uncorroborated testimony of a fifteen-year-old complainant, Weinberger
cannot be explained by the fact that it involved complainants who were older than twelve.
Query: Is the key to Weinberger the circumstance that there were two complainants, so
that one corroborated the other?
100. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22(1) (McKinney 1971).
101. See text accompanying notes 66-77 supra.
102. People v. Gibson, 301 N.Y. 244, 93 N.E.2d 827 (1950) (female under eighteen
years of age cannot consent, and therefore cannot be an accomplice to the crime of incest) ;
People v. Weinberger, 2 App. Div. 2d 806, 153 N.Y.S.2d 926 (4th Dep't 1956) (mem.), aff'd
mere., 2 N.Y.2d 892, 141 N.E.2d 630, 161 N.Y.S.2d 146, cert. denied, 354 US. 913 (1957)
(complainant in carnal abuse case cannot be an accomplice); People v. McKinney, 20 Misc.
2d 976, 188 N.Y..2d 728 (Kings County Ct. 1959) (infant complainant cannot be an ac-
complice to the offense of impairing his morals). But d. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22(3)
(McKinney 1971), which provides: "A witness who is an accomplice . . . is no less such
because a prosecution or conviction of himself would be barred or precluded by some de-
fense or exemption, such as infancy . .. .
103. People v. Knorr, 281 App. Div. 772, 118 N.Y.S.2d 429 (2d Dep't 1953) (mem.)
(infant under twelve can be an accomplice to sodomy, in which case his testimony must be
corroborated). But see People v. McKinney, 20 Misc. 2d 976, 978, 188 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731
(Kings County Ct 1959).
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evidence for its side of the story, and the presumption of innocence gives
way to the emotion of outrage.0 4 But to say this is not to prove it. One
wonders whether a court or legislature free of tradition would indepen-
dently come to the conclusion that the plight of a person accused of a
sex offense is worse than the plight of a person accused of any of the
hideous crimes for which no corroboration is required. If the ordinary
safeguards suffice for a case of murder, blackmail, or robbery, why do
they fail for a case of rape? 0 5 Jurors are not ignorant; they look with
suspicion upon ipse dixit complaints of sexual misconduct0 0 and, in any
event, appellate courts do not hesitate to reverse "thin" convictions.1
0 7
However, the matter is not open to debate. After so many years of
taking for granted that the evidence offered by complainants in sex of-
fense cases should be corroborated, it is unlikely that members of the
judiciary and legislators will look at the problem afresh and suddenly
announce that the corroboration rule should no longer exist. 0 Rather
than totaling up its merits and demerits, therefore, it should be assumed
that the requirement of corroboration, in one form or another, is a perma-
nent part of the law of New York State. Accordingly, efforts should be
directed toward improving it.09 To this end there are three ways.
First, the exemption from the requirement of corroboration of sexual
abuse in the third degree" 0 should be eliminated. It has been conjectured
that the only reason for the exemption is that the legislature had thereby
104. See note 7 supra; Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1137,
1138-39 (1967).
105. When all is said and done, it just might be that the requirement of corroboration In
prosecutions for sex offenses (where, remember, the complainant is usually female and the
defendant almost always male) is nothing more than another illustration of the law's un-
equal treatment of women.
106. Wigmore § 2061. One empirical study has shown that juries seldom return convlc-
tions in rape cases. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 253 (1966).
107. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
108. For an argument in favor of jettisoning the corroboration requirement completely
see Ludwig, The Case for Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Requirement in New York, 36
Brooklyn L. Rev. 378 (1970).
109. Some commentators have urged that something which they would consider stronger
or surer than ordinary corroboration be required. E.g., compulsory psychoanalysis of the
complainant (3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 924a (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970)), wide open
admissibility of evidence bearing on the complainant's moral and mental qualities
(id. § 924b), physical examination of both complainant and defendant (44 N.YU.L. Rev.
1025, 1033 (1969)), lie-detector interrogation of the complainant (30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 994,
1004 (1955)), as to rape, complaint to the authorities within three months of the offense
(Model Penal Code § 213.6(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)).
110. N.Y. Penal Law § 130.15 (McKinney 1967); see text accompanying note 66 supra.
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hoped to reach uncorroborated sex offense cases."' If so, the decision in
Doyle"' precludes any such result and disappoints the legislature's hope.
Nothing remains to justify the exception;"13 consequently it should be
abandoned.
Second, the requirement that the defendant's connection with the com-
mission of the offense be corroborated should be eliminated while retain-
ing, however, the requirement of corroboration for the corpus delicti." 4
The danger sought to be avoided by the corroboration rule is that of the
deranged complainant who invents a story of sexual indignities visited
upon her. That she will accuse the wrong person of an offense which actu-
ally occured is a possibility neither more nor less troublesome in sex of-
fense cases than in any other kind of case. Thus, where the commission
of a sex offense has been corroborated there is no need peculiar to sex
offense cases for the corroboration of the complainant's testimony as to
the identity of the offender. To require it, moreover, is to impose "an im-
practicable burden on the prosecutor."" 5
Third, it should be provided that the complainant's uncorroborated
testimony of a non-sex offense is sufficient for a conviction of the non-sex
offense even though committed with a sex offense. At present, on such
a record the conviction must be reversedq----a result "repellent to any
111. 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1025, 1029 (1969).
112. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
113. The practice commentary on section 130.15 is silent. Denzer & McQuillan, 1967
Practice Commentary to N.Y. Penal Law § 130.15, at 278 (McKinney 1967). One scholar
has stated that he cannot understand why the exemption was written into the statute.
Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32 Brooklyn L. Rev. 274, 275 (1966). More-
over, it cannot even be argued that sexual abuse in the third degree-a class B misdemeanor
(N.Y. Penal Law § 130.55 (McKinney 1967))-is a less serious offense than any for which
corroboration is required. Corroboration is required for consensual sodomy, and it also is
a class B misdemeanor. Id. § 130.38.
114. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
115. Model Penal Code § 207A, Comment 22, at 264 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This sec-
tion provides: "The text requires corroboration, but does not attempt to particularize as to
its nature. A general caution to the authorities against convicting on the bare testimony of the
prosecutrix may be desirable in view of the probable special psychological involvement, con-
scious or unconscious, of judges and jurors in sex offenses charged against others. The only ra-
tional alternative would be to require corroboration as to every element of the crime,
since there is no reason to believe that complainant is more likely to lie or deceive heself
on one point rather than another. A requirement as broad as that would impose an im-
practicable burden on the prosecutor . . . ." It has been suggested that the requirement
of corroboration as to the defendant's identity be retained in cases where there has been
"consent!' by a complainant incapable of consenting because of age or mental condition.
See Comm. on Criminal Courts, Law and Procedure of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., 1971 Legis. Bull. No. 28.
116. People v. Radunovic, 21 N.Y.2d 186, 234 N.E.2d 212, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967).
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sense of logic or justice .... .,,' In short, a defendant who merely assaults
a complainant goes to prison since the complainant's uncorroborated
testimony suffices to convict, whereas a defendant who assaults and rapes
her goes free since her uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to convict
of either the assault or the rape." 8 Such a result is ridiculous. Section 130.15
of the Penal Law should be amended to provide that the corroboration
requirement does not apply to non-sex offenses, whether or not associated
in the complainant's testimony with the commission of a sex offense.
The implementation of these changes might go far toward rationalizing
a rule which, however salutary its original intention, has thus far in its
existence been troublesome in application and at times absurd in result.
117. Id. at 191, 234 N.E.2d at 215,'287 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (Breitel, J., concurring).
118. Assuming here, of course, that the proof of the rape is "integral" to proof of the
assault. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
